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Executive Summary 
 On March 31, 2009 a Request for Information (RFI) was issued by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Program to gather input on the subject of Verification and 
Validation (V & V) of Flight-Critical Systems.  The responses were provided to NASA on or before April 
24, 2009.  The RFI asked for comments in three topic areas: Modeling and Validation of New Concepts 
for Vehicles and Operations; Verification of Complex Integrated and Distributed Systems; and Software 
Safety Assurance.  There was a strong response with a total of 34 responses to the RFI, representing a 
cross-section of academic (26%), small & large industry (50%) and government agency (24%).   The 
organizations that replied are listed below: 
 
Organization 
Adventium Enterprises, LLC 
BAE Systems 
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada - Department of Computer Science and Software 
Engineering  
DornerWorks, Ltd. 
Draper Laboratory 
E L I AUS, LAMPS and University of Manchester, United Kingdom et al 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) - Software and Digital Systems (SDS) Program 
Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC) 
Honeywell International Inc. 
Lockheed Martin 
NASA Ames Research Center 
NASA Glenn Research Center 
NASA Langley Research Center 
National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) – Air Transport Safety Institute 
National Transportation Safety Board 
Ohio University - School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science  
Oregon State University - School of Mechanical, Industrial, and Manufacturing Engineering  
Rockwell Collins, Inc. 
Scientific Monitoring, Inc. 
Software and Digital Systems 
Software Intensive Systems, Inc. 
SRI International Computer Science Laboratory  
Stinger-Ghaffarian Technologies 
The MITRE Corporation - Center for Advanced Aviation System Development 
The University of Iowa -The Virtual Soldier Research Program, Center for Computer-Aided 
Design 
United Space Alliance 
United Technologies Research Center 
University of Virginia, Department of Systems and Information Engineering 
United Technologies Corporation - Pratt & Whitney  
Vanderbilt  
Table 1: List of Organizations that Responded to V&V RFI 
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The respondents universally acknowledged the importance of developing more effective methods and 
techniques for the verification and validation of flight critical systems.  Implicit in their comments was 
the encouragement for NASA to take the lead in developing improved methods and techniques for V & V 
of critical systems.  Indeed, many mentioned that other safety critical systems shared the need for 
improved V & V methods.  It was clear from the responses that the difficulty of verifying and assuring the 
validity of increasingly complex systems is universally acknowledged. 
It should be noted that the respondents generally acknowledged a need for research and development in 
all three of the topics listed in the RFI, and many then addressed one or more of the specific topics.  There 
was considerable variation in the subject matter and in the technical depth of the respondent’s comments, 
with more consistency among the responses by type of organization than by the topics listed in the RFI.  
Consequently, summary comments of the responses are provided in a structure which reflects the 
organizational breakdown of the respondents. 
The need for consideration of the human in the definition of the system was acknowledged in several of 
the responses.  More adequate modeling of human cognition and performance as well as human-machine 
interactions were of particular interest.  Additional mention of modeling was common, especially the need 
for validation of the models used in simulations. 
Considerable emphasis was placed on design phase analysis and verification.  The continued need for 
formal methods in verification was noted and it was acknowledged that a provably correct code 
generation capability needs to be developed.  However, it was also proposed that a fundamental departure 
from current technology is necessary for software construction, and that it must be more holistic was a 
consistent theme. 
A particularly noteworthy suggestion made was that a team of world-class technical experts be engaged to 
help guide the research effort through a series of workshops. 
Judging by the interest shown in the RFI, the Verification and Validation of Flight-Critical Systems is a 
subject which many members of the aviation community view as a necessary and timely subject for 
research and development of new methods, technologies, and policies. 
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Introduction 
This Report provides a synopsis of the responses to the Request for Information (RFI) issued by NASA’s 
Aviation Safety Program entitled “REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN ‘VERIFICATION AND 
VALIDATION OF FLIGHT-CRITICAL SYSTEMS’”, Solicitation Number NNH09ZEA001L.  This RFI 
solicited information on Verification and Validation (V&V) challenges for the next generation of flight-
critical systems.  The RFI was issued on March 31, 2009 and responses were submitted to NASA by noon 
on April 24, 2009. 
A summary of the RFI is presented with identification of the goals and objectives of the effort.  The topic 
area structure that the RFI requested the respondents use is also described.  However, comments outside 
of the provided structure were explicitly identified as welcome within the RFI.  Responses were submitted 
by organizations broadly representing Industry, Academia, and Government. 
The responses were tabulated and statistical information which categorizes the responses in terms of the 
respondent and the topic area is provided. 
An aggregated summary of the technical content of the responses is also provided. 
 
Summary of Request for Information 
The current aviation system has an enviable safety record; however, advances in technology are placing 
an increasing strain on our ability to assure the integrity of new and anticipated systems.  Additionally, 
there is a perception that current approaches for the assurance of complex flight-critical systems impose a 
barrier to innovation. 
Under this RFI, the NASA Aviation Safety Program solicited insight into V & V obstacles to timely and 
cost-effective implementation of flight-critical systems, i.e., systems comprising hardware, software and 
physical systems, used to execute pre-defined concepts of operation or operating procedures, and 
interacting with human operators including pilots and controllers, that will directly control some aspect of 
flight and thus must be demonstrated to the highest levels of safety.  Additionally, the RFI solicited 
insight into innovative theories, methods and tools for V & V of Flight-Critical Systems at all levels of 
development.  Articulation of all obstacles to their implementation was encouraged, including further 
technical developments required, changes they imply in current processes for design, test and evaluation, 
regulatory compliance and other implementation considerations, and other implications such as policy 
concerns.  This focus was identified in the RFI as supporting the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen), targeting NextGen safety activities and interests encompassing vehicles, vehicle 
systems, airspace, airspace concept of operations, and air traffic technologies such as communication, 
guidance and navigation. 
Within the RFI, three broad categories were identified for the purposes of organizing possible research 
and objectives.  Suggestions for alternate organizations of the research areas, and descriptions of V & V 
issues not noted in the three topics below, were encouraged.  The following topic descriptions are 
excerpted from the RFI. 
Topic 1.  Modeling and Validation of New Concepts for Vehicles and Operations:  Current safety 
assessments of new concepts for vehicles and operations need to be extended to better address 
transformative changes that are not covered by extending current V & V methods.  In addition, there is a 
need to predict key blocks to human performance and to provide rigorous design guidance early-and-
throughout development of these concepts.  The objective is to develop safety-case methods and 
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supporting technologies, such as methods for modeling concepts of operation to identify safety issues, 
capable of analyzing the system-wide safety properties suitable for civil aviation vehicles and for complex 
concepts of operation involving airborne systems, ground systems, human operators and controllers. 
Topic 2.  Verification of Complex Integrated and Distributed Systems: The integration of functions 
across traditional boundaries (e.g., integration of discrete and continuous behaviors, integration of 
distributed vehicle (and ground-vehicle) functions, novel distributions of functions between air and 
ground and between human and automation) demands new methods for predicting, assuring and proving 
the safety levels demanded of NextGen.  The objective is to develop a collection of technologies and 
mathematical models that enable rigorous, comprehensive analysis of new integrated (and distributed) 
systems interacting through various structures such as communication networks and human-automation 
and human-human interaction. 
Topic 3.  Software Safety Assurance: Establishing sufficient confidence in the safety of complex 
software-intensive systems, such as those envisioned for NextGen, is a significant challenge.  While this 
problem has been widely recognized, it is generally viewed as incremental changes to a current process 
that is cost-prohibitive and automatically precludes a wide range of functions and capabilities; thus, a 
transformative view of software safety assurance is needed.  The objective is to develop a collection of 
techniques, tools, and policies which will enable efficient and accurate analysis of safety aspects of 
software-intensive systems; ultimately reducing the cost of software V & V to the point where it no 
longer obstructs many safety innovations and NextGen developments, and ultimately enable in-the-field 
assurance of composed software-intensive systems. 
 
Summary of Responses 
Respondent and Response Topic Statistics 
There were 34 responses to the RFI, representing a reasonable cross-section of academic (26%), small & 
large industry (50%) and government agency (24%).  
There were 17 responses to the RFI from Industry [Adventium, Florida Institute for Human and Machine 
Cognition, BAE Systems, Boeing Enterprises, Dorner Works (2), Draper Laboratories, Honeywell, 
Lockheed Martin, NLR/ASTI , Rockwell Collins, SMI, Software Intensive Systems, Inc., SRI 
International, USA LLC, UTC Pratt Whitney, and UTRC]. 
There was one response to the RFI jointly authored by Industry and Academia [UVA-NIA]. 
There were five responses to the RFI from Academic Institutions [Concordia University, Ohio University, 
University of Iowa, University of Manchester, and Vanderbilt]. 
There were three responses to the RFI jointly authored by NASA and Academia [NASA Ames-University 
of California, NASA Ames-UCLA, and NASA Ames-Oregon State-Ohio State]. 
There were four responses to the RFI from within NASA [Ames (2), Glenn (1), and Langley (1)]. 
There were two responses to the RFI from Non-NASA Government Agencies [FAA, and NTSB] and two 
responses from Federally Funded Research and Development Centers [JPL Laboratory of Reliable 
Software, and MITRE CAASD]. 
There were 13 responses addressing Topic 1 of the RFI. 
There were 10 responses addressing Topic 2 of the RFI. 
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There were 13 responses addressing Topic 3 of the RFI. 
There were seven responses that did not address a specific topic but provided general input on the subject 
of the RFI.  Additionally, several of the responses which addressed specific topics also provided more 
general input to the subject of V&V of Flight-Critical Systems. 
 
Aggregated Technical Response 
All of the responses acknowledged the importance of developing more effective methods and techniques 
for the verification and validation of flight critical systems.  Implicit in their comments was 
encouragement for NASA to take the lead in developing improved methods and techniques for V & V of 
critical systems.  Indeed, many mentioned that other safety critical systems, beyond aviation, shared the 
need for improved V & V methods.  It was clear from the responses that the difficulty of verifying and 
assuring the validity of increasingly complex systems is universally acknowledged.   
 
Respondents generally acknowledged a need for research and development in all three of the topics listed 
in the RFI, however there was considerable variation in the subject matter and in the technical depth of 
the respondent’s comments, with more consistency among the responses by type of organization than by 
the topics listed in the RFI.  Consequently, summary comments of the responses are provided in a 
structure which reflects the organizational breakdown of the respondents. 
 
Appendix A provides a summary of responses listing needed V&V methodologies, targeted application, 
problems addressed and suggestions for types of V&V products that might fill technological gap.  
 
Emerging V&V Challenges 
Noted emerging V&V challenges include:  increasing system complexity; an exponential increase in 
software requirements; an increase in tests required using current V&V methods; safety, cost and 
schedule impacts associated with V&V; emergence of distributed architectures & trends in 
microprocessor technologies; emergence of multi-Vehicle and cooperative control Requirements. 
 
Collaboration 
Many of the respondents saw the need for collaboration between technical experts across NASA, 
industry, academia, FAA, and other government agencies.  Safety assurance approaches for Air Traffic 
Management and Aircraft should have clear engagement of certification authorities as well as aerospace 
industries with domain experts in aircraft, ground, and space flight critical systems.    
 
Responses from Industry 
Virtually all of the Industry responses endorsed the effort by NASA to consider the need for research in V 
& V.  One respondent expressed the need for the results of any research program to be made publicly 
available so that the entire community can benefit.  Several suggested formation of a cross-functional 
team including NASA, industry (Airframe, Engine, and Subsystem Manufacturers), academia, and the 
FAA to help guide the research effort. 
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Considerable variation existed in the responses from Industry in both the breadth and depth of the 
information provided.  Several of the responses offered the use of tools which had been developed to 
assist in the V & V of safety-critical systems.   
The response from the Air Transport Safety Institute of National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) in The 
Netherlands was motivated by the similarities between NextGen needs and those of (Single European Sky 
ATM Research (SESAR).  Both air traffic system modernization projects seek to implement large, 
complex, distributed systems which have to contend with internal and external stochastic influences for 
which traditional safety analysis tools are inadequate.  From this response, it is clear that the European 
community is also making an effort to address the myriad issues facing the introduction of complex flight 
critical systems.  The need for data collection processes that focus on ensuring new complex systems 
work as intended when they become operational. 
Common subjects addressed in the Industry responses included: 
The need for consideration of the human in the definition of the system was acknowledged in several of 
the responses.  More adequate modeling of human cognition and performance as well as human-machine 
interactions were of particular interest.  The use of human-in-the-loop simulations was suggested to be of 
considerable value.  The need for techniques for validating Air Traffic Controller Human Agent Models 
was noted as well as decision protocols for V&V of human-automation interfaces on aircraft. 
Respondents placed considerable emphasis on design-phase analysis and verification.  Included was the 
need to develop sound design processes, structural principles, and associated philosophies supporting the 
development of flight critical systems.  Several responses addressed the need for an optimized V&V 
structure to be used early in the design process based on formal methods and dependability cases.   
Many responses recommended utilization of a unified approach such as dependability cases or safety 
cases as a means to improve requirement definition  and provide systematic and rigorous analytical 
methods for validating safety requirements.  Responses specified the need for new and improved ways to 
represent system and software requirements and one response suggested the creation of an ontology that 
could be queried throughout the product lifecycle about inferences or potential ramifications of a 
requirement or specification.  Another respondent recommended a fully functional approach to safety 
assessment according to guidance contained in industry safety standards and FARs:  Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) 4761 " Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment", ARP 4754 "Certification Considerations for Highly-
Integrated Or Complex Aircraft Systems", ARP 5150 "Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in 
Commercial Service" , Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 25.1309.   
A focus on modeling was common, especially on the need for validation of the models used in 
simulations.  Also noted was the need to understand the uncertainty represented by the models and how 
that affects their results and their use.  Consideration of both state- and model-based architectures was 
suggested.  It was noted that the models need to address system level properties.  Continued use of 
enhanced closed-loop models to analyze system performance was encouraged. 
The continued need for formal methods and formal verification was noted.  One respondent encouraged 
the development of methodologies for the analysis of complex uncertain systems.  Many respondents 
called for improved formal verification enabling subsystem validation in the context of entire vehicle-
level integrated system.  Use of formal methods and formal verification was seen as a viable alternative to 
reducing predicted NextGen exhaustive testing requirements.  In Formal Methods, the need for new V&V 
automatic analysis techniques combining model checking and theorem proving was noted. 
 8 
 
One response stated that a provably correct code generation capability needs to be developed.  Another 
proposed that a fundamental departure from current technology is necessary for software construction and 
that it must be more holistic. 
 
Joint Response from Industry and Academia 
The joint Industry/ Academia response suggested that a breakthrough in integration of formal methods 
and human factors engineering methods is required to include human behavior in the formal verification 
process. 
 
Responses from Academic Institutions 
One response suggested that self-forensics technology taken from the cyber-crime domain may be useful 
in V & V of flight critical systems.  Another suggested that an error analysis of the accumulation of small 
(quantization, round-off) errors would be helpful in understanding its potential impact on the performance 
of the system. 
Another respondent forwarded the proposition that new human-human interaction and human-automation 
interaction simulation tools will help identify safety concerns.   
Another suggested that research in Automatic Flight Control Systems control algorithm V & V be 
conducted. 
 
Joint Responses from NASA and Academia 
One respondent suggested that recent developments from the IVHM domain could augment V & V of 
NextGen software systems. 
Another respondent proposed building on the work done be the Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
into functional failure identification and propagation, suggesting that it could be helpful in the design 
phase of critical systems. 
Another respondent suggested that traditional methods or formal methods alone are not adequate to 
conduct V & V of complex systems and that statistical validation tools are needed. 
 
NASA Responses 
The responses from NASA generally discussed subjects which could provide for improved V & V but 
needed additional research.  These subjects included:  the advocacy of probability analysis as a means to 
translate the objectives of the system into a set of required system parameters; the need to adopt recent 
progress in formal methods theory and software verification tool development; and development of 
structural principles for mission and safety critical flight software systems. 
One response advocated the use of advanced V & V techniques already developed and employed to 
provide benefit in the future.  Conversely, another response provided a discussion of the rapidly 
increasing complexity of aviation systems, including software, and that current V & V methods are not 
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sufficient.  Another response presented the case for applying new developments in V & V to electronic 
hardware systems as well as to the air transportation system. 
 
Responses from Non-NASA Government Agencies 
A response from the FAA presented some of the improved safety techniques and tools being applied to 
both software and airborne electronic hardware systems.  The NTSB provided a response which endorsed 
the efforts by NASA to increase the level of safety in flight critical systems and encouraged the use of 
their accident and incident databases.  The NTSB's response called for specific research in the following 
areas: identifying, predicting, and resolving potential airspace system failure modes; determining how 
technological approaches may assist pilots in identifying and recovering from inflight upsets; ensuring 
that verification and validation processes and tools adequately consider operator abilities; and designing 
data collection processes for ensuring that new complex systems work as intended during their operation.  
The response also emphasized the difficulty of ensuring that software-intensive systems are safe, and the 
importance of using existing accident and incident data, reports, studies, and safety recommendations to 
provide insight into the limitations of current V&V processes. 
 
Closing 
Judging by the interest shown in the RFI, the Verification and Validation of Flight-Critical Systems is a 
subject which many members of the aviation community view as a necessary and timely subject for 
research and development of new methods, technologies, and policies. 
NASA wishes to express their appreciation to all of those who responded, and encourages them to 
continue their contact with NASA as the results of this RFI are included in the planning of NASA’s future 
research programs. 
For further information on this subject, please contact: 
Sharon S.  Graves 
MS 238, 4 Langley Blvd, B1230:R214  
NASA Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-0001  
Phone: 757.864.5018 (office), 757. 506.5388 (cell)  
E-mail: Sharon.S.Graves@nasa.gov 
  
APPENDIX A:  SUMMARY OF RFI RESPONSES TO NASA SOLICITATION NUMBER NNH09ZEA001L, DATED APRIL 2009
Legend: SIS = Software Intensive Systems, DS = Distributed Systems, A&A = Authority and Autonomy, SA = Safety Assurance
Research 
Area
V&V Methodology Application Problem description V&V Product
SIS
DS, A&A, 
SA
Optimized V&V Structure for early 
software design
Flight-critical software systems;
Mixed redundancy systems
Adaptive control system
Increased levels of autonomy and automation requires 
fundamental effort to V&V using current techniques
Optimized V&V structure for early software design;
include Formal Methods and safety/dependability case approach
SIS
DS
A&A
Optimized V&V Structure for early 
software design
Flight-critical software systems;
Mixed redundancy systems
Adaptive control system
Increased levels of autonomy and automation requires 
fundamental effort to V&V using current techniques
V&V early design algorithm checkers; data handlers; and system 
integration techniques
SA
SIS
Optimized V&V Structure for early 
software design
Flight-critical software systems;
Mixed redundancy systems
Adaptive control system
Increased levels of autonomy and automation requires 
fundamental effort to V&V using current techniques
Formalization and standardization of dependability case methodologies
SIS
SA
Optimized V&V Structure for early 
software design
Flight-critical software systems;
Mixed redundancy systems
Adaptive control system
Increased levels of autonomy and automation requires 
fundamental effort to V&V using current techniques
Error susceptibility & risk management 
SIS
SA
Optimized V&V Structure for early 
software design
Flight-critical software systems;
Mixed redundancy systems
Adaptive control system
Future aircraft trend toward multivariable and model-
based controls introducing complex and intensive math 
into software
Formal methods  to be used in early design to obtain verification credit 
and reduce need for exhaustive testing;
Safety case approach working in concert with certification authority and 
industry
A&A Techniques for Validating Air Traffic 
Controller Human Agent Models 
Automation-supported separation 
management
Changing roles and responsibilities currently employed by 
air traffic controllers & flight crews driven by NextGen goal 
of safely and efficiently supporting 3 times present-day 
traffic levels.  Calls for a substantial employment of 
advanced automation for separation assurance and other 
airspace management functions. Unconventional 
allocation of functions between air traffic controllers and 
automation have no standard and verified means of 
evaluation  considering the unprecedented operational 
Controller agent models and V&V schemes with qualitative and 
quantitative aspect prediction; 
controller in the loop simulations;
aspects should consider operational criteria, human cognitive 
capabilities and limitations
A&A
SA
Decision Protocols for V&V of Human-
Automation (Software) Interfaces on 
Aircraft
Task of control and management of 
aircraft, onboard autonomy and human 
operators
Future aircraft trend toward multi-agent systems - 
unchartered roles and responsibilities
Conflicts between TCAS and ATC, inconsistent protocols, 
or inconsistently followed protocols
Procedures for rigorous and comprehensive analysis and inclusion of 
verified decision protocols
V&V methods for human-centered automation and organization 
automation
definition of human-in-the-loop simulations that are integral to V&V of 
systems;
scenarios, principles and human factors V&V criteria and issues
SIS
DS
SA
Aircraft Software Configuration 
Verification and Management.
Aircraft configuration management Manual process for managing aircraft configurations no 
longer viable
Technology refresh problem as h/w, s/w ages
Simplified onboard network to receive and perform configuration 
verification and management
Interchangeability/Compatibility Database to ensure combinations of 
h/w and s/w are valid and safety
Ground-based data management system
SA Validation of safety requirements for 
product development and continued 
airworthiness
Aircraft flight critical systems Improved rationale needed for validated requirements for 
improved safety at reduced cost
Systematic and rigorous analytical methods of aviation safety data in 
support of risk analysis prescribed by SAE ARP 4761
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Research 
Area
V&V Methodology Application Problem description V&V Product
SIS
DS
SA
Airplane, System and Functional 
Analysis Methodology for Product 
Development and Continued 
Airworthiness.
Aircraft flight critical systems System and Functional Analysis methodologies
- Configuration control, including interfaces to design tools and 
requirements data bases. 
- Linkage to multi-variety performance and regulatory criteria 
- Simple and intuitive interfaces to allow standardized and specialized 
analyses, including Monte-Carlo or equivalent methods to assess a 
massive matrix of failure combinations. 
- Emphasis on airplane level safety assessment 
- Failure case summaries and report generation. 
SA Airplane, System and Functional 
Analysis Methodology for Product 
Development and Continued 
Airworthiness.
Aircraft flight critical systems Fully functional approach to safety assessment according to guidance 
contained in industry safety standards and FARs: SAE ARP 4761, ARP 
4754, ARP 5150, FAR 25.1309
SA Safety Certification Process for ATM 
Systems
Aircraft flight critical systems On average, it takes 18 years to introduce new system or 
procedure in ATM system.  Established processes for 
ground based (SMS) and separate processes to certify 
safety of airborne systems.
Need safety certification process that takes entire operation into 
account, joining ground-based systems/procedures w/ airborne 
systems/procedures.
SIS
DS
SA
Assessment tools for necessary V&V Flight critical systems Methods for determining minimum V&V required for certification while 
ensuring safety and reliability
DS Systems validation approaches Propulsion system development and comprehensive 
checkout often precedes airframe development by several 
years.  Vehicle control system not available to support 
engine software V&V
Improved methods for formal verification that enable subsystem 
validation  in context of entire vehicle-level integrated system
SIS
DS
SA
V&V optimizing techniques Flight critical systems no effective notation for specifying system design (arch 
specs, interconnections bet fcn comp)
Compositional verification; Reusable certified code; Cookie cutter 
approaches;
New methods for requirements understandability/clarification
SIS
SA
Continuous validation methods Flight critical systems Control system V&V cost and schedule challenges have 
become so great that they now constrain industry's ability 
to introduce new and upgrade existing aerospace 
products;
 
Run-time adaptive safety assurance system monitoring and mitigation 
capability 
SIS Formal Methods for Software V&V 
cost reduction 
Flight critical systems There are still many technical challenges to be overcome 
to enable FM application to full range of problems found 
in large, complex systems
Model checkers unable to analyze complex continuous 
geometries typical in aircraft conflict detection
New V&V analysis techniques (e.g. proof scripts to drive the automated 
application of theorem provers or script-based invocation of model 
checkers)
SIS Formal Verification Methods for 
numerically intensive systems
ADS-B applications (Surface Indications 
& Alerts, In Trail Procedure (ITP), 
Closely Spaced Parallel Approaches 
(CSPA), Flight Deck Merging and 
Spacing, and Airborne Conflict 
Management
These applications involve non-linear trajectory 
computations that generally go beyond the capabilities of 
current formal method techniques
New V&V analysis techniques (e.g. proof scripts to drive the automated 
application of theorem provers or script-based invocation of model 
checkers)
automatic analysis by combining model checking and theorem proving
SIS
DS
SA
Composition Techniques for Software 
Safety Assurance
Flight critical systems Architectures will leverage new and existing sub-systems;
Current certification approach for such systems limits the 
reuse of certification evidence of components from 
previously certified systems in new and updated systems.
Compositional development approaches
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Research 
Area
V&V Methodology Application Problem description V&V Product
SA V&V Automated Techniques to ensure 
safety of complex FCS systems
Flight critical systems New methods needed for establishing safety at lower cost 
and schedule
V&V automated techniques that exploit safety certification and 
assurance; 
Develop trusted suite of assessment tools that evaluate whole body of 
safety evidence
Provably correct code generation
DS Technologies to support V&V of 
Nonlinear control
Adaptive Flight control systems Incorporation & implementation of nonlinear control 
designs into an integrated flight control system which is 
valid throughout nonlinear operating envelope of a 
modern transport aircraft is often problematic;  Monte 
Carlo-based analysis and simulations often costly and 
require revalidation
Develop V&V techniques applicable to nonlinear control systems to 
expand acceptance of highly nonlinear, coupled vehicle dynamics 
models within the controller
DS Common V&V processes for 
facilitating Integration of Aircraft 
Systems (to Increase Performance)
Aircraft flight critical systems Flight performance improvement can be achieved through 
integrating aircraft subsystems
Develop V&V processes and structure for V&V design to facilitate 
efficient integration and testing
SIS Software process for enabling 
rigorous, comprehensive analysis of 
FCS system
Flight critical systems Advances in flight control technology outpacing software 
verification techniques
Formulate transformative process for enabling certifiable and cost-
effective analyses of the safety aspects for adaptive flight critical system 
software
SA Unified approach for 
specifications/requirements at system 
level
Flight critical systems Lack of formal interaction semantics specification Techniques for specifying interactive properties and automatic 
verification
Ontology that can be queried about inferences and potential 
ramifications of a requirement or spec through life cycle
DS Architectural modeling and analysis Flight critical systems Large systems consisting of networks of interacting 
components remain a challenge for V&V techniques
Fault tolerance methods; virtual machine infrastructures; mixed 
criticality components 
DS Architectural modeling and analysis Flight critical systems Large systems consisting of networks of interacting 
components remain a challenge for V&V techniques
Provide research to provide V&V methods for system integration that 
validate system is performing as desired
architecture modeling
reasoning methods for sync and async communications
compositional reasoning
methods that verify capable operation in the face of reduced or 
eliminated system assets.
SA
DS
Unified approach for 
specifications/requirements at system 
level
Flight critical systems Control system V&V cost and schedule challenges have 
become so great that they now constrain industry's ability 
to introduce new and upgrade existing aerospace 
products;
innovation barriers
Safety based decomposition through dependability cases
Formal Analysis tools
SIS Model based software engineering Flight critical systems Although a number of tools are available, difficulties arise 
in producing an integrated environment that allows for 
seamless operation over models representing numerous 
aspects of analysis and synthesis 
Integrated V&V environments for testing
SA
DS
Unified approach for 
specifications/requirements at system 
level
Flight critical systems Lack of design modeling techniques at the system level Effective notation standards for specifying requirements;
standardization and acceptance of modeling notations and tools;
architecture specification of processing/communication resources;
interconnections among the functional components;
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